What If Every Team Was Required To Have Three Catchers On Their Roster

Its impact on roster construction, player valuation, game strategy, and more

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The catcher is one of the most resource-intensive positions in baseball. It combines the highest physical workload with one of the steepest offensive penalties, and its defensive value is tied to skills that are difficult to quantify and replace. Under current roster rules, teams typically carry two catchers on a 26-man active roster, accounting for roughly 7.7% of roster spots leaguewide. What if teams were required to carry three catchers on their roster? While this idea is far from reality and unlikely to ever occur, it is nonetheless interesting to examine the impacts it would have on roster construction, player valuation, game strategy, and organizational decision-making. Mandating that every team carry three catchers would raise that figure to 11.5%, a seemingly marginal change that would significantly alter roster construction, player valuation, and decision-making processes across baseball operations.

Current State: Catcher Production and Market Dynamics

From a value standpoint, having a solid catcher is notoriously important. According to Baseball Reference's WAR statistic from 2025, catchers produced an average of 2.1 WAR per team, ranking third among all positions, tied with third basemen, and behind only shortstops (3.4 WAR) and centerfielders (2.3 WAR). However, league averages in a vacuum hide the true distribution of talent at the position. Only 13 teams had catchers combine to produce 2.0 WAR or better in 2025, ranking sixth out of eight defensive positions in terms of teams reaching that threshold. Conversely, nine teams had catchers combine for 3.0 WAR or better, third-best among all positions. This suggests significant talent at the top of the catcher market but a concerning lack of depth among average catchers throughout the league.

This uneven distribution reflects the position's developmental challenges. According to MLB Pipeline's 2025 rankings, primary catchers comprised only 12 of Top 100 prospects. The position requires drastically more defensive development than other positions with years of development in pitch framing, game-calling, blocking, and throwing mechanics. All while simultaneously trying to build offensive offensive skill at roughly the same pace. 

Roster Construction: The Cost of Redundancy

The financial and roster opportunity cost of a third catcher is significant. Given the current 26-man roster limit and 13-pitcher maximum, teams have 13 positional spots available: eight starting fielders, one designated hitter, and four bench spots. While teams may carry a five-man bench with 12 pitchers, this is fairly uncommon across the league. Of the four typical bench spots, one is usually allocated to a backup catcher, leaving three spots to maximize marginal advantages through platoon bats, pinch runners, late-inning defensive replacements, or versatile defenders who provide utility leverage across multiple positions.

Many of these bench players provide value beyond their raw WAR or other metrics through matchup-specific usage or highly specialized skills such as speed or elite defense. A third catcher, by contrast, is unlikely to drastically impact most games on a regular basis unless multiple injuries occur. This constraint would reduce specialized bench spots from three to two, forcing teams to choose between defensive flexibility, platoon advantages, or speed assets. Roster construction would require a drastic increase in prioritization amongst the remaining 2 bench spots. The marginal injury mitigation of carrying a third catcher full-time does not currently justify the roster redundancy cost.

Player Valuation: Supply, Demand, and Market Inefficiency

Player valuation would shift dramatically, particularly at the margins of the talent pool. Replacement-level catchers would gain value not due to improved performance but because of newfound necessity. Currently, teams rely on Triple-A depth and emergency call-ups, knowing the probability of losing two catchers in a single game or short stretch is minimal. A three-catcher requirement removes that flexibility, creating league-wide demand for 30 additional major league caliber catchers.

Given that catcher is already among the thinnest positions in terms of talent distribution, this mandate would substantially increase the value of versatile defenders even if their offensive contributions remain minimal. The impact would be felt through the entire player development system. Organizations would need to allocate greater resources toward catching instruction, potentially diverting developmental attention and budget from other positions. Draft strategy would also adjust, with teams selecting catchers earlier or more frequently to ensure organizational depth.

This structural shift would affect both arbitration and free agency markets as well. Backup catchers currently earn near the league minimum ($780,000 in 2026) or modest arbitration salaries. Increased demand could shift the salary distribution upward slightly. Even a marginal increase of $1 million to $2 million per team devoted to catching depth would create noticeable ripple effects, particularly for clubs operating near the $244 million competitive balance tax or any of the $20 million interval thresholds above it. For teams hovering near this limit, the added salary commitment could force difficult decisions regarding complementary roster pieces or prevent pursuing marginal upgrades elsewhere.

From a roster construction standpoint, this would elevate the importance of cost-controlled, team-controlled catching depth, incentivizing teams to prioritize internal development over external acquisition. Organizations with robust player development infrastructure and strong catching development would gain competitive advantage. Teams lacking these resources would face premium costs in trade or free agent markets where supply would be constrained.

Positional Flexibility: The Premium on Versatility

Positional flexibility would take on heightened importance under this constraint. Catchers who can credibly defend another position, most commonly first base, would become immensely valuable. Players athletic enough to handle third base or corner outfield spots would command even greater premiums. Someone like Willson Contreras, who has played innings at first base, outfield, and catcher would become much more valuable. MJ Melendez, who plays corner outfield in addition to catching, would also become exponentially more desirable.

These versatile players would help mitigate the inherent inefficiency of carrying an extra specialist by preserving roster flexibility. If a team's third catcher can credibly start at first base against tough pitching or provide late-game defensive replacement value in the outfield, the roster spot becomes justifiable beyond pure catching depth. Conversely, catcher-only profiles with limited offensive potential would become harder to justify unless they provided absolutely elite defensive value.

Defensive metrics would likely carry more weight in evaluation models as teams attempt to extract maximum value from an otherwise redundant roster slot. Blocks above average, catcher framing runs, pop time, and caught stealing above average would become critical evaluation criteria for second and third catchers. Pitcher performance data with specific catchers, would gain importance in determining which catchers merit roster inclusion.

Offensive Production and the Catcher-by-Committee Concept

Pitching staffs and in-game strategy would also be affected. With three catchers available, teams could more aggressively tailor catcher-pitcher pairings, particularly for young starters, command-oriented arms, or pitchers with unique pitch shapes, such as a knuckleball, that benefit from specific receiving skills. While unconventional, this could enable a catcher-by-committee approach with specialized pairings optimized for pitcher success.

Workload management would improve significantly. Primary catchers could receive more scheduled rest without forcing teams into deficit scenarios or emergency situations. The physical toll of catching is well-known along with fatigue with catchers typically getting day games off after a night game.

However, these benefits must be weighed against offensive reality. Catchers produced the third-worst OPS among the eight position groups in 2025 at .700. This is ahead of only second basemen (.680) and centerfield (.698). Only the Seattle Mariners, led by Cal Raleigh's exceptional .948 OPS, had catchers combine for an .800 or better OPS. Catcher is one of only three position groups (along with second base and center field) with one team or fewer combining for .800 OPS or better. Significant offensive development among second and third catchers would be necessary for a true catcher-by-committee system to function without creating significant lineup consequences.

Strategic and In-Game Implications

Strategically, in-game decision-making would evolve considerably. Managers would be more willing to pinch-run for catchers in late-game situations, deploy pinch hitters in key matchups, or remove catchers at the first sign of minor injury or fatigue. Currently, managers must weigh the risk of losing their backup catcher against the immediate strategic benefit of a substitution. With a third catcher available, this changes entirely.

Emergency catching situations, which are rare but events that introduce significant variance, would be effectively eliminated. These scenarios create competitive imbalance and unpredictable outcomes. A third-catcher mandate would prevent such situations almost entirely.

While this implementation would increase roster redundancy and reduce health risk, it would shift competitive advantage toward organizations with deeper, more accurately evaluated talent pools and superior developmental infrastructure. Teams that fail to properly evaluate their third catcher or maximize positional flexibility would experience inefficiency daily. Conversely, teams that identify undervalued defensive catchers internationally, later draft rounds, or minor league free agency could quietly gain an edge.

This approach would enforce complete roster depth and construction optimization rather than simply chasing elite talent at the top of the market. It would eliminate the extreme clustering of talent that currently characterizes the catcher position.

Organizational Philosophy: Risk Versus Efficiency

At a macro level, this hypothetical highlights a central tension in modern roster construction: maximizing marginal value versus minimizing risk. The two-catcher model optimizes efficiency at the expense of risk tolerance. A three-catcher mandate forces teams to accept redundancy and inefficiency in exchange for stability and creativity. In such an environment, roster evaluation would need to place greater emphasis on depth planning, defensive versatility, and long-term player development, particularly at a position where replacement options are limited and evaluation mistakes prove costly.

Organizations would need to fundamentally reconsider their risk tolerance frameworks. Teams currently operating with aggressive roster construction strategies, maximizing every bench spot for matchup advantages, would face the steepest adjustment. Conservative organizations that already prioritize depth and injury protection would adapt more seamlessly, potentially gaining competitive advantage during the transition period.

The financial implications extend beyond direct salary costs. Increased emphasis on catching development would require expanded coaching staffs, enhanced technology and analytics infrastructure for catcher evaluation, and potentially larger minor league rosters to maintain organizational depth. These secondary costs disproportionately affect smaller-market teams with constrained player development budgets. Though MLB now regulating the use of data and tech in the minor leagues would balance this out a bit more.

Conclusion: Structural Change as Organizational Evaluation

Ultimately, requiring teams to carry three catchers would not dramatically change how baseball is played on a pitch-to-pitch basis. Instead, it would expose organizational strengths and weaknesses in evaluation, development, and resource allocation. Teams with strong internal alignment, robust depth pipelines, and sophisticated player development systems would adapt quickly and potentially gain competitive advantage. Organizations lacking these resources would struggle to justify the opportunity cost and would likely overpay in trade or free agent markets to acquire necessary depth.

As with most structural changes, the competitive advantage would not come from the rule itself but from how effectively organizations adjust their decision-making processes to operate within new constraints. The three-catcher mandate would serve as a comprehensive organizational stress test, rewarding front offices that combine analytical rigor, developmental expertise, and strategic foresight while exposing those that rely on market efficiency and roster optimization shortcuts.

The hypothetical provides insight into how small regulatory changes can create cascading effects throughout baseball's competitive dynamics, altering not just roster construction but also draft strategy, player development priorities, salary allocation, and long-term organizational planning.